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Purpose of the Study
The primary purpose of this study is to determine how successful
congressional efforts have been toward regaining control over the federal
budget. Congressional control over fiscal matters can be divided into
two broad categories: control over the internal processes of Congress
which include committee assignments, the struggles for power, influence
and control among the various committees and subcommittees, and the struggle
between the Senate and the House of Representatives. The second category
deals with the struggle between the Legislative and the Executive Branches
of government to exercise control over fiscal policies. It is this second
category of struggle that this study wi'll identify, describe and analyze.
This study will trace the development of the congressional role in the
budgetary process and the subsequent transfer of control to the Executive
Branch. Special emphasis will be placed on the reform legislation pending
before the 92nd Congress in order to capture the current mood of the
Congress and the nation as a whole.
This study will not analyze the criticisms that have been or
are now directed at the organization and procedures of Congress. It is
not the purpose of this paper to evaluate such criticisms or levy new
criticisms against the congressional system of organization, committee
structure, leadership hierachy, or any of the other facets of the
Legislative Branch.

2The sources of information were both primary and secondary.
To gain insight into the reform legislation currently before the 92nd
Congress, personal interviews were held with selected officials and
staff personnel directly involved with the legislation. Additionally,
copies of printed hearings and committee reports were utilized as sources
of information.
In analyzing the effectiveness of the reforms attempted by
the Congress, an attempt was made to view the results as objectively as
possible. No value judgments were made regarding whether or not the
reforms were necessary; rather, the amount of control that Congress
recaptured or the promise of increased influence and power was the basis
for evaluating the reforms.
Organization of the Study
In order to provide the background necessary to understand the
changing roles of the Legislative and Executive Branches of government,
Chapter II of this study will trace the development of the congressional
budgetary role and examine the factors that prompted the transfer of
influence and control from the Legislative to the Executive Branch. The
congressional authority provided by the Constitution of the United States
and the internal organization of Congress will be examined and related
to the relationship of the two branches as it concerns the budgetary
process.
Chapter III will identify and discuss the significant reform
measures that have been implemented from 1921 through 1950.. These
reforms serve to clarify the moods of the Congress during this span of

3nearly thirty years. Some proved to be more effective than others, and
the reasons underlying their success or lack of success will be analyzed.
Chapter IV deals with the reform measures since 1950, including
actions pending before the Ninety-Second Congress. These measures will
be examined in some detail in an effort to gain clearer insight into
the nature of the reforms and thus the current mood of the Congress. Such
analysis can be the initial step toward forecasting future congressional
reforms and perhaps provide insight concerning future relationships
between the Legislative and Executive Branches regarding budgetary policy
and the control of national objectives and priorities.
Chapter V summarizes the effectiveness of the reforms attempted
and examines the potential effectiveness of the legislation pending before
the Ninety-Second Congress.
Chapter VI summarizes this study and comments on the prospects
for meaingful budgetary reform.
Background
Fiscal control has developed into a technique of tremendous
influence. The whole budget system is essentially a device constructed
for administrative supervision, and the preparation and execution of the
budget requires considerable centralization of authority in the Executive
Branch. Although Congress participates in the budget making process,
its role is essentially that of critic and facilitator rather than of
generator and leader. Since the turn of the century, the role of Congress
has steadilly become less and less one of initiating policy alternatives

4and more and more that of modifying, negating, or legitimating proposals
that originate in the Executive Branch.
Congress has attempted various budgetary reform measures,
and proposals for added control continue to be offered and considered.
Some have considerable merit while other are worthless and mischievous.
President Nixon has submitted his FY 72 budget in which he seeks programs
totaling 229 billion dollars. It is obvious that the annual budget of
today represents significant changes from an earlier period in the method
of making policy decisions. Today it is an enormous undertaking which
provides funds for carrying out almost all government policy. Congress,
on the other hand, is accustomed to dealing with limited policy by small
committee groups, and a budget that is so comprehensive and exhaustive
both in stating broad national policy and in assigning relative priorities
among the proposed programs is certain to give the Congressman a feeling
of frustration and helplessness. It is this situation that prompts the
many proposals for budgetary reform.
Budgetary reform is said to accomplish three major purposes:
1. To strengthen congressional control over the totality of spending
2. To strengthen congressional control over policy decisions.
3. To give Congress further information on past spending.
These purposes are so interrelated that excessive emphasis on one may
diminish the emphasis on the others. In examining the reforms during
this study, the threefold objectives will be of paramount interest.
^Roland Young, The American Congress
,
(New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1958), p. 241.

5Congress, in attempting to regain budgetary control, seeks
added responsibility in developing the budget initially and desires that
the President should confer with its leaders on budgetary questions in
the same fashion that he consults with them on questions on legislative
policy. The dogma has been developed that the President should not deal
with troublesome politicians in framing the budget, but submit to con-
gressional review and criticisms of his proposals.
The control by the President has been greatly increased, but
the congressional role has never been fully developed. The effective
authority of Congress is certainly decreased when major policy decisions
are made by the President or other units of the bureaucracy. The
equilibrium of influence between Congress and the President is constantly
fluctuating and the fulcrum of authority appears to have shifted to
the President. This study undertakes the analysis of the efforts of
Congress to cause this fulcrum of authority to be returned to the Congress

CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY ROLE
Congress occupies a strategic position in the budgetary
process and derives its basic authority to raise revenues and expend
public monies directly from the Constitution of the United States.
Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution grants all legislative powers
to the Congress and provides for the establishment of the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Article I, Section 8, empowers Congress to make
all laws considered necessary in order to carry out their responsibilities
It further provides specific power to lay and collect taxes; to borrow
money, and to coin money. Article I, Section 9, provides that "no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations
made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and
expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."
This constitutional base of authority not only served to
establish the powers of Congress in the areas of legislation, raising
revenue, and expending public monies, but effectively gave Congress
limited control over the Executive Branch through its authority to
determine the level of expenditures.
It is important to recognize also that the Constitution
provided for the separation of powers of the Legislative and Executive




The writers of the Constitution of the United States
established a separation of powers by providing for a Congress
and a' President on the same legal plane, then blurred the
separation by giving each certain rights to check or influence
the activities of the other.'
From the earliest days of the republic, Congress began to
exercise its power and influence provided by the Constitution and was
immediately confronted with the conflicts with the Executive Branch.
Congress was secure in its role as possessor of control over fiscal
matters, but in the early days of the young nation, the congressional
involvement in fiscal matters was minimized.
Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury,
was successful in gaining the confidence of the Congress and stressed
the desirability of "executive direction" in the formulation of fiscal
policies. He was given wide authority in the preparation and reporting
estimates of public revenue and expenditures. With the Federalists in
control of both branches of government, -Hamilton was successful in
recommending that appropriations be granted under a few generalized
headings with few, if any, legislative restrictions. The House Committee
on Ways and Means, established in 1789 to consider and report on financial
matters, was discharged in that same year from such further considerations*
Their functions had been transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury.
The powerful role that Hamilton had engineered for himself
continued until 1795. During that period, Congress was beginning to
mount pressure for a stronger role in government expenditures and, through
1 Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration ,
(Washington, D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1964), pp. 3-4.

8the leadership of Albert Gallatin, began to voice the need to recapture
those constitutional responsibilities relinquished to the Executive
Branch.
There arose within the Congress a theory of "legislative
restraint", referring to legislative controls to be exercised over the
Executive Branch through the imposition of specific appropriations. The
mood of the nation was prime for such a shift of control because the
Hamiltonian theory of "executive descretion" had gained wide political
opposition throughout the country. In 1795 Hamilton resigned as
Secretary of the Treasury and the Republicans had gained a majority in
the House of Representatives. Again, under the leadership of Gallatin,
the Ways and Means Committee was re-established and began to recapture
congressional control over appropriations and expenditures.
In 1801, Jefferson became President and Gallatin became his
Secretary of Treasury. The theory of legislative restraint was accentuated
to the point of complete congressional dominance. The executive was under
the complete control of Congress and could depart from specified appropria-
tions only under conditions of national emergency. In 1802, the Ways and
Means Committee was made a standing committee, and the Congress continued
to exercise oversight and control over the Executive Branch by enacting
rigid, detailed legislation. By 1860, the Ways and Means Committee was
the most powerful and influencial committee in the House of Representatives.
By 1865, the Ways and Means Committee was so overburdened with
the increased responsibilities brought on by the Civil War that a new
House Committee on Appropriations was formed. Under the leadership of
Garfield and Randall, this new committee became the real source of power
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completely dedicated to their responsibility for guarding the Treasury
and reducing government expenditures.
By 1880, the House appropriations Committee was so overloaded
with the appropriations process that it began to be stripped of juris-
diction over certain appropriation bills. This marked the beginning
of what was to become an almost complete congressional loss of control
over fiscal matters. The House voted to grant budget review authority
to the substantive committees which gave them jurisdiction over those
programs. Federal expenditures increased rapidly in the absence of a
coordinated review of the overall expenditures authorized by the Congress.
A major factor contributing to the erosion of the congressional
power and control was the President's power to transfer appropriations
from one program to another during periods of congressional recess.
Also, the President had this authority of transfer during war and during
periods of preparation for war. Further, the practice of deficiency spend-
ing became wide spread among the executive agencies and departments. The
more rigid and specific the appropriation, the greater the practice of
deficiency spending became. Congressional action in 1874 effectively
removed all legal authority for the executive departments to transfer
appropriations, and the Anti -Deficiency Act of 1906 provided for the
apportionment of appropriations throughout the fiscal year. Under the
Act, appropriations were to be apportioned to the agency or department
head in such a manner to prevent deficiency spending.
During World War I, Congress relinquished its control and
permitted extended executive discretion. Congress approved general
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appropriations, and deficiency spending was freely permitted. At the
close of the war, Congress attempted to return to specific appropriations
and shut off deficiency spending but soon recognized the futility of
their efforts.
In the face of continued frustration, Congress sought new
solutions to the problems involving executive agency and department
transfers of funds and deficiency spending. In 1919, the House Select
Committee was established to consider the following approach to the
problems of fiscal control:
1. Fixing executive responsibility for the budgetary estimates
submitted to Congress.
2. Creating a governmental instrument for the audit of executive
accounts, primarily responsible to Congress.
3. Internal consolidation of the congressional budget system.
The results of this study were incorporated into the first
significant budgetary reform measure, the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921. The details of this Act will be discussed in Chapter III of this
study, and it is sufficient at this point only to mention that the mood
of the nation was receptive to such reform, because there was national
pressure to reduce expenditures and taxes and to put the business of
government on a "business basis". The Budget and Accounting Act
centralized the responsibility for budget submission in the Executive
Branch and created the Bureau of the Budget to assist the President in
the preparation of the budget. To offset this concentration of Executive
power and control, the Congress provided for the creation of an "agency"
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of its own, the General Accounting Office. The purpose of the General
Accounting Office was to perform accounting and auditing functions over
the Executive Branch in order that Congress might accurately review
executive performance.
The General Accounting Office did not prove to be the
equalizer that Congress foresaw, and the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921 marked a decisive shift in budgetary control from the Legislative
to the Executive Branch of government.
The need for additional budgetary reform did not peak again
until after World War II. In 1945, the Joint Committee on the Reorganiza-
tion of Congress was established under the leadership of Senator Robert
LaFollette, Jr., and Representative Mike Monroney. The studies and
recommendations of the joint committee resulted in the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1946. The notable budgetary reform aspect of this
Act was the establishment of the Legislative Budget. In a move to regain
budgetary control from the Executive Branch, Congress proposed to establish
a ceiling on the amount of expenditures based on considerations of the
President's recommendations. After considering all anticipated receipts
and all estimated expenditures, it was to recommend to the Congress the
maximum amount to be appropriated for expenditure in the next fiscal year.
The Legislative Budget was never actually implemented, and in
1949 Senator MacKellar sponsored a resolution to remove the provisions
for a Legislative Budget from the Act of 1946.
A second reform measure was legislated in 1946 which plays
an important part in the development of the congressional role in matters
of fiscal concern, and this was the Employment Act of 1946. The provisions
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of that Act that concern this particular study are those establishing
the President's Council of Economic Advisors and Congress' Joint Economic
Committee. The Council of Economic Advisors was established to assist
the President in the preparation of his annual Economic Report, a report
required by the Act, and the Joint Economic Committee was created to
offset the budgetary advantage the Council of Economic Advisors promised
for the Executive Branch. The Joint Economic Committee was to review
the Economic Report of the President and submit a separate Joint Economic
Report to the Congress.
This exchange of "council" for "committee" resulted in a
further shift of budgetary control to the Executive Branch, but the
Joint Economic Committee offers promise of added strength to the Congress.
Continuing to recognize the need for further congressional
reform to regain budgetary control, Senator McClellan sponsored the
establishment of a Joint Committee on the Budget that was reported out
by the Senate Expenditures Committee in 1952. This was a powerful measure
that would provide a congressional committee broad powers over the executive
departments and essentially restore budgetary control in the Congress.
The measure was not accepted by the House of Representatives
primarily due to the strong opposition of Representative Cannon, powerful
Speaker of the House, and the bill was killed. The importance of Senator
McClellan's bill was that it emphasized the realization of many, if not
most, congressmen that budgetary control was centralized in the Executive
Branch, and the internal struggles of Congress itself were the main de-
terrent to restoration of congressional control.
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While the Senate was attempting to institute reforms
through Senator McClellan's bill, the House was attempting reform
measures through the Omnibus Appropriation Bill. This proposal was
one which consolidated the various appropriation bills into a single
measure. By this procedure, Congress would have complete overview of
the impact of approved expenditures and effectively control the level of
expenditures.
This approach also met with failure for fear of extending the
President's control over the budget via the item veto provision. With
authority to veto specific portions of approved appropriations, the
President" could alter the effect of the entire bill and effectively gain
additional budgetary control.
Congress continues today in its role as critic and facilator
of the President's budget, and the struggle to regain budgetary control
from the Executive is ever present as the nation enters the decade of
the Seventies. The Legislative Reoganization Act of 1969 and the Fiscal
Act of 1970 are ample evidence of the attempts of Congress to shift the
center of budgetary power and control in its favor.
This brief history of the development of the congressional
role in the budgetary process clearly indicates the tremendous congressional
strength that peaked around the period of the Civil War and the gradual
erosion of its powers since that time. With each reform measure undertaken
by the Congress, the Executive Branch became more powerful at the expense




Before proceeding with the examination of the significant
congressional reform measures, a brief review of the congressional system
of committees and subcommittees will be made. It is not the purpose of
this review to either support or criticize the committee structure, but
to show how they function and provide insight into the underlying reasons
for the success or failure of Congress' attempts to regain budgetary control
Before he became President, Woodrow Wilson wrote "I know not
how better to describe our form of government in a single phrase than by
calling it a government by the chairman of the standing committees of
Congress." This statement might need some modification to fit today's
political scene, but the committees of Congress still play a significant
role in all affairs of government. The use of committees to assist
Congress in the disposition of its legislative business originated in
the first Congress, but the organization and functions of committees have
undergone substantial change.
At the beginning there were no standing committees, and a
special committee was established to consider each bill introduced in
Congress. Gradually, the special or select committees assumed jurisdiction
over certain legislative subjects and began to function as standing
committees. By 1913, the peak year for standing committees, there were
sixty-one standing committees in the House and seventy-four in the Senate.
1 Kenneth B. Keating, Government of the People
,
(New York
The World Publishing Company, 1964), p. 70.
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Some were eliminated during the period from 1913 to 1945, and the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 further reduced the House and
Senate combined total from eighty-one to thirty-four. Currently in the
92nd Congress there are thirty-six standing committees.
Congressional committees are powerful and their influence far
reaching. None is more powerful or more influencial than the Senate and
House Appropriations Committees. These committees are organized and
function through their respective autonomous subcommittees. Their autonomony
is not absolute, however, since each must be responsible to the parent
committee. The foremost characteristic of the House Appropriations
Committee. is its decentralization process of budgetary decision making.
The various subcommittees have become specialized in certain activities
and programs and limit its review and inquiry to that small fragment of the
total budget. Richard Fenno, in The Power of the Purse , explains the
necessity for this fragmented approach as follows:
Only by specialization can they (Congress) unearth the
volume of information necessary for the intelligent, critical
screening of budget requests. Only by developing their own
expertise can committee members successfully counter the
battery of experts sent down by each executive agency to
defend its budget
J
Although the subcommittees enjoy a great amount of independence
in their day-to-day operations, they are expected to conform to the norms
established by the parent body. Deviations from such norms could bring
reprisals in the form of nonsupport of their recommendations on the floor
of the House, or stripping the subcommittee of some of its power. The
^Richard Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse - Appropriations
Politics in Congress
,




members of the subcommittee stand to lose their individual influence and
power from such reprisals and generally adhere to the norms of the full
committee.
The basic work of most committees is carried on behind closed
doors. After all public hearings have been held on the bill, the
committee members go into executive session to "mark up" the bill. The
politics of this bargaining and log-rolling which finally produces, or
fails to produce, a bill is not publicly known.
Because of its power, the membership of a committee and
subcommittee is of crucial importance. Extreme caution is exercised in
appointing members to the House Appropriations Committee in order to insure
that all members share the basic values and beliefs of the full committee.
In the House, the committee is generally held to be an exclusive committee;
that is, members are net appointed to any other committee. This has the
advantage of allowing members to devote their full energies to their
subcommittee, and they can usually expect to serve year after year on
that same subcommittee. This more or less permanent assignment serves
to heighten the Appropriations Committee interest in the programs and
activities for which it provided funds. As Joseph Harris observes,
...the powerful and hard-working House and Senate Appropriations
Committees of recent years, which, acting through subcommittees, not
only systematically and minutely inquire into the administration of
policies and programs when they review the itemized budget requests
of all executive agencies, but also exercise continuing surveillance
over agency activities throughout the year.
2
^Richard Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee
as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," The American
Political Science Review , LVI (June, 1962), 310-324, reprinted in
Congressional Reform: Problems and Prospects , Edited by Joseph S.
Clark, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell , 1965), p. 270.
^Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration ,
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964), p. 47.
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The Senate Appropriations Committee's smaller membership does
not permit exclusive committee assignments, and the average senator has
less time to devote to the details of the appropriations measures.
The committee system of organization and operation is important
to the individual congressman. In the House he must compete with 434
other congressmen, but in the committee environment he can find meaningful
work and satisfy his desire for respect, influence, and trust. Reform
measures that congressmen preceive to diminish the role of their committees
and thereby diminish their own roles in the political environment, are
certain to be rejected. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees
possess staggering power, and proposals for budgetary reform are carefully
analyzed in the light of potential loss of committee power.
Congress is apparently satisfied with the committee structure
and its method of conducting the business of government. The esprit,
solidarity, and integration of committee, members has been an effective
shield against reform over the years. Most reform measures would cause
some redistribution of power and most certainly diminish the authority and
influence that presently exists. Fenno points this out in his description
of committee integration and resistance to reforms:
...the internal integration of this committee (Appropriations)
helps to explain the extraordinary stability, since 1920, of
appropriations procedures - in the face of repeated proposals
to change them through omnibus appropriations, legislative budgets,
new budgeting forms, item veto, Treasury borrowing, etc. 1
This review of the committee structure explains, in part,
the political implications of adopting reform measures and especially
1 Fenno, "The House Appropriations Committee as a. Political
System," reprinted in Congressional Reforms , Edited by Clark, p. 274.
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those reforms that might apply to the powerful House and Senate Appropria-
tions Committees. As observed by Joseph Harris in Congress and the
Legislative Process
,
Congress is wery conservative in considering any changes in
its organization and procedures, which are the product of two
centuries of evolution .... Any proposed reform that affects
the power structure will be strongly resisted by those who hold
the power .... Changes will be adopted only when the need is
clear and the demand for reform is great.
'
The following chapter examines significant budgetary reform
proposals that were attempted by the Congress during the period
1921 - 1950.
1 Joseph P. Harris, Congress and the Legislative Process ,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 56.

CHAPTER III
SIGNIFICANT REFORM MEASURES FROM 1921 - 1950
Background
The struggle of Congress to regain its control over the
federal budget from the Executive Branch has been evident since the
days following the Civil War. This chapter will discuss the significant
efforts of Congress to effect budgetary reform and its attempt to shift
the power structure within the federal government.
Prior to the enactment of the first of these major reform
measures, the business of the nation was conducted behind the scene of
public politics. The country was in the strangle of "boss rule" which
effectively kept the financial transactions away from public view. Power
was concentrated in the hands of a few, while the expenditures of govern-
ment had tripled during the period from 1885 - 1912. Public pressure was
ever increasing to end the back door politics in government and end the
corrupt practices that contributed significantly to the wasteful ex-
penditures of government funds. It was this public mood with accompanying
pressure that set the stage for what was to become continuing attempts
by Congress to regulate the business of government and to gain additional





The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was the first signi-
ficant reform that Congress attempted to gain budgetary control. The
move toward this reform gained momentum during President Taft's admini-
stration when, in 1910, he appointed the Commission on Economy and
Efficiency to study methods of transacting the government's business.
In 1912, President Taft sent a message to Congress concerning "Economy
and Efficiency in the Government Service." Later that year a report
was forwarded to Congress by the President on "The Need for a National
Budget." Both of these documents were of vital importance, because they
examined for the first time the detailed structure of the government and
the character of government expenditures.
At this stage, the Congress was opposed to the concept of an
executive budget, and failed to seriously consider President Taft's
recommendations. The Congress insisted on having the executive depart-
ments and agencies submit appropriations requests according to existing
laws and directly to the Congress.
President Taft was defeated in the election of 1912 and his
budget submission to Congress was not acted upon. President Wilson
became concerned with matters other than the executive budget and this
area of control was not to be approached again until after World War I.
In 1919, the House of Representatives established a Select
Committee to study the possibility of instituting a national budget.
The committee agreed early in its activities that a national budget
system was both desirable and urgently required. The discussions and
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hearings which followed were centered around the question of what type
of agency should be established to operate such a budget system. There
were those who felt the system should be operated by the President and
others who felt the Treasury Department, under the direction of the
President, should have responsibility for implementing the budgetary
system.
The Select Committee's recommendations were overwhelmingly
approved by the House on October 21, 1919. Some House members, including
the powerful Speaker of the House, voiced objections to an executive
budget on the grounds that control would be concentrated further in one
branch of government, and that the budget would no longer adequately
represent the needs of the voters of the country. This was the view of
a minority, however, and the majority of the members of the House felt
that an executive budget system would "strengthen and improve the ability
of the Congress to control national finances." The House generally
viewed the concept of the national budget as a means of reducing federal
expenditures and would clear the way for legislating reductions in the
tax rates.
Due to the pressure of consideration on the Versailles Treaty,
the Senate did not act on the bill until 1920. The measure was passed
by the Senate that year, but because of President Wilson's opposition
to the provision that the Comptroller General, the head of the General
Accounting Office created under the Act, could not be discharged by the
'Jesse Burkhead, Governmental Budgeting
,
(New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956) , pp. 26 - 27.
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President, the bill was vetoed. President Wilson was defeated in the
subsequent election by Harding, and on June 10, 1921, President Harding
signed into law the Budget and Accounting Act.
The Act provided for the procedural steps in the budgetary
process, those steps being developed around the constitutional require-
ments for the separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive
Branches. In step one, the President, with assistance from the newly
created Bureau of the Budget, must prepare annually a unified budget
covering the total fiscal requirements of the government and submit the
budget to Congress in January. In step two, Congress reviews the budget
and authorizes funds for those programs it approves. In step three,
the government spends the authorized funds; and, in step four, the
newly created General Accounting Office audits and accounts and submits
its reports to Congress.
In enacting the Budget and Accounting Act, the Congress in-
tended to gain fiscal control over national expenditures and at the
same time yield to the national pressure that demanded a more business-
like approach in the operation of the federal government. To counter
balance the additional power and control the Executive Branch would
enjoy through the Bureau of the Budget, Congress established the General
Accounting Office.
The General Accounting Office was to be an extension of
Congress, an "arm of Congress", examining and investigating the
expenditures of funds by the Executive Branch. The Congress viewed the
function of the GAO as initiating the return to the basic concept of
legislative control over federal funds. By having its own nonpartisan,
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nonpolitical agent to furnish information concerning the financial
transactions of the government, Congress could ensure that expenditures
were made according to their intended purposes. In addition to the audit
function, the GAO was given the power to prescribe the forms, systems,
and procedures for administrative appropriation and fund accounting.
In his reports to Congress, the Comptroller General was to make recom-
mendations concerning greater economy and efficiency in public
expenditures.
The General Accounting Office did not provide the counter
balance to the Bureau of the Budget that Congress had hoped, and the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 resulted in added strength and power
for the Executive Branch. The functions of the GAO have been limited to
post-audit functions that center around the legality of expenditures
rather than how efficiently the funds were used. Congress has also been
accused of negligence in its use of GAO,- especially the House Appropria-
tions Committee. Further, the pre-audit examination of the budget by
GAO failed to develop, and today that agency does not review agency
budget justification until after the appropriations bills have been
passed.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
The next significant reform legislation was not passed until
1946, and this was the Legislative Reorganization Act. The Joint
Committee on the Reorganization of Congress was established in 1945
with the responsibility for reviewing congressional procedures and
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recommending methods for gaining control and oversight over the Executive
Branch. The major budgetary reform aspect of this Act centers around its
provision for a "legislative budget."
Under the concept of the legislative budget, all receipts and
expenditures were to brought together for simultaneous fixing of targets.
The House Appropriations Committee, the House Ways and Means Committee,
together with the Senate Appropriations Committee and Senate Finance
Committee were to meet jointly at the beginning of each session to review
the President's budget and recommend to the Congress a legislative budget
that would provide a ceiling on expenditures. The idea behind the legis-
lative bud-get approach was to provide for high-level debate on expenditures
and revenues, and strengthen congressional control of the nation's purse
by adopting a target of expenditures beyond which total appropriations
could not go. The Joint Committee on the Budget was to report annually,
by February 15, its recommendations concerning the maximum amount to be
appropriated for expenditures in that year, including a reserve for
deficiencies. In effect, these procedures would provide Congress with
the means of determining the broad fiscal policy of the government.
The legislative budget concept failed to prove workable.
Although the Joint Committee produced a concurrent resolution for budget
adoption in 1947, it became deadlocked in conference. The House and
Senate conferees were unable to reach agreement concerning the division
of the expected surplus betv/een tax reduction and debt retirement, and
the resolution was effectively killed. In 1948, both the House and
Senate passed the Joint Committee's resulution on February 18 and 27,
respectively, but the Congress exceeded the budget ceiling by more than
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$6 billion. In 1949, on the third and final attempt to effect a
legislative budget, both Houses agreed to postpone the date for reporting
the legislative budget from February 15 to May 1. By May 1, eleven
appropriations bills had bassed the House and nine had passed the Senate,
and no further action was taken to submit a resolution.
One other provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act
that evidenced congressional concern over the growing power of the
Executive Branch was the authorization for larger congressional staffs.
This Act, in fact, marked the real birth of the congressional staff
system.
The need for increased expert staffs for the fiscal committees
of Congress had long been advocated. During - the 77th Congress, Representa-
tive Dirksen, then a member of the House Appropriations Committee, told
the House:
There is nothing so discouraging as an Appropriations subcommittee
hearing, with the committee members on one side of the table and
the agency heads and their experts lined up on the other. They have
all the facts at their finger tips, but all they need to tell us is
what they want us to know. We have no way of checking up on them.
We don't even know enough to ask the right questions. It's a sort
of combination quiz program and fishing expedition. It's like
attempting to try a case in court without witnesses and without
evidence. The defendent gives the only testimony.'
Even with this feeling of many of its members, the House
Appropriations Committee has resisted pressures to increase its staff.
It is generally accepted that the reason for such resistance is the risks
'George B. Galloway, Reform of the Federal Budget
,
(Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress Legislative Reference
Service, 1950), p. 122.
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that such a staff might become too independent and effectively usurp the
legislative role. The reluctance of the Appropriations Committee to
build an adequate staff to avoid the situation expressed by Representative
Dirksen contributed to the imbalance of budgetary control which existed
between the Legislative and Executive Branches.
The Employment Act of 1946
During the period just prior to the end of World War II, the
government was deeply concerned that the nation would enter a period of
recession or depression when the war came to an end. There had been such
periods at the close of previous wars, a condition brought about by massive
unemployment and the economy gearing from military support to domestic
production. It was during the war years, 1944, that Congressman Wright
Patman (Texas) warned his constituents that "unemployment is the most
serious postwar problem ahead of us. He contended that if our postwar
industry could not absorb the potential workforce returning from military
service, it was the federal government's responsibility to create jobs
and prevent excessive unemployment.
It was this general feeling throughout Congress that gave rise
to a full employment bill, legislation that theretofore would have met
with certain defeat. Senator Murray (Montana) drafted a proposed bill
entitled "Legislation for Reconversion and Full Employment" which passed
the Senate on September 29, 1945. Representative Patman introduced a
full employment bill which was adopted by the House on December 14, 1945.
'U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Twentieth
Anniversary of the Employment Act of 1946
,
(Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 133.
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It then became the task of the House- Senate Conference Committee to work
out a compromise acceptable to both Houses. There were strong feelings
concerning each version of the bill, and it appeared that a stalemate
was certain. It was through skillful redrafts that agreement was finally
reached on a revised bill entitled "The Employment Act of 1946." The
bill passed the House and Senate on February 6 and February 8, respectively,
and was signed into law by President Truman on February 20, 1946.
The Employment Act directed that the President should submit
to Congress not later than January 20 of each year an "economic report"
that advised the Congress of economic conditions of the country. This re-
port was to contain four basic categories:
1. The levels of employment, production and purchasing power in the
United States and the levels needed to carry out the basic policy of the
law.
2. Current and foreseeable trends jn the levels of employment,
production, and purchasing power.
3. A review of the economic programs of the federal government and
a review of the economic conditions affecting employment.
4. A program for carrying out the policy declared in the Act,
together with such recommendations for legislation as he may deem
desirable.
To assist the President in the preparation of the Economic
Report, and to gather timely, authoritative information, the Act created
the Council of Economic Advisors.
To offset the advantage afforded the President via the Council
of Economic Advisors, the Act provided for a congressional committee for
the purpose of reviewing the President's Economic Report. The original
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version of the Act called the committee the "Joint Committee on the
Economic Report;" however, by a 1956 amendment, the committee name was
changed to "Joint Economic Committee." This committee is composed of ten
members of the House and ten members of the Senate. The function of the
committee is as follows:
(1) to make a continuing study of matters relating to the
Economic Report; (2) to study means of coordinating programs
in order to further the policy of this Act; and (3)
as a guide to the several committees of the Congress dealing
with legislation relating to the Economic Report, not later
than March 1, of each year (beginning with 1947) to file a
report with the Senate and the House of Representatives
containing its findings and recommendations with respect to
each of the main recommendations made by the President in the
Economic Report, and from time to time to make such other
reports and recommendations to the Senate and House of
Representatives as it deems advisable.'
The Joint Economic Committee has provided Congress with a
broader perspective on national economic policy and the resulting im-
plications of the federal budget. Its functions regarding budgetary
control are, at best, indirect. The analysis submitted to Congress
concerning the President's Report is highly regarded by congressmen,
and the legislative committee members are, to some degree, influenced
by the committee report. Advisory committees in the past have had little,
if any, influence on the members of legislative committees, and, con-
sequently, have done little to affect governmental policy. The Joint
Economic Committee offers promise of being the exception and appears to
be the most logical and likely committee to perform overall consideration
of fiscal policy and to influence the fiscal policies that emerge from
the Congress.
^ Employment Act of 1946, As Amended, With Related Laws
,
Statutes at Large, LX, Sec. 23, (1969), p. 4.
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In 1963, the JEC advised the Congress and the public of its
intent to enter the field of budgetary forecasts. In a Joint Committee
Report, the committee advised that it
will attempt to provide to the Congress and to other interested
groups our best assessment of the types of changes that are
occuring in the budget and their significance on aggregate
receipts and expenditures.'
This was a clear statement of their desire to exercise firmer control
over the President's recommended fiscal policies prior to their
authorization by Congress.
The unique nature of the committee's function gives it a
distinct advantage over most other committees. The JEC is not confined
to a specialized mission in the field of agriculture, banking and currency,
or other specific microeconomic areas. The committee has produced studies
on automation, low-income families, fiscal policy, agriculture, economic
stability and growth, the balance of payments, to cite only a few. No
other committee has such a broad mandate. This broad insight that the
committee enjoys can certainly account for the prestige it demands through-
out Congress and the Executive Branch. It also accounts for the influence
its recommendations produce within the legislative committees.
The Joint Economic Committee is a diversified, informed
committee that is potentially qualified to perform its functions, and
exert powerful influence over fiscal policy.
'U.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the Joint Economic
Committee on The Federal Budget as an Economic Document , S. Rpt. 396
88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, p. 20.

29
The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950
During the period of 1947 - 1949, when the Joint Committee
on the Budget was attempting to implement the legislative budget, other
congressmen were exploring variations of the concept of a consolidated
congressional budget. In 1947, the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration established a subcommittee and conducted hearings on a
proposal to consider all general appropriations bills in one consolidated
(omnibus) appropriations bill. This was another effort by Congress to gain
an overview of the President's budget by discontinuing piecemeal
appropriations, and reviewing planned expenditures along with the estimates
of revenues.
The procedure for considering the President's budget and
appropriating funds under the Omnibus Appropriations Act was for the full
Appropriations Committee to function as a central committee over the
various appropriations subcommittees. The subcommittees were to review
portions of the President's budget and forward recommendations concerning
appropriations to the central committee. All recommendations would be
held by the central committee pending completion of review by all sub-
committees. The committee would have completed subcommittee reports
concerning both expenditures and revenues, and would have the necessary
information to reduce expenditures and thus reduce the federal debt or
tax rate. This method was viewed as an effective means of controlling
federal budgetary policy and would significantly shift the power structure
in favor of Congress.
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While the legislative budget was finally killed in 1949, the
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee advised the Congress that
he would implement the Omnibus Appropriations Bill in January, 1950.
Due to delays in both Houses, the bill was not signed by the President
until September 6, 1950. In the next session of Congress, the House
Appropriations Committee voted to return to the traditional procedure of
appropriating individual bills.
The revolt of the members of the House Appropriations Committee
probably resulted from a feeling that the Omnibus Appropriations Act
concentrated undue influence and power in the hands of the Chairman.
Additionally, the concept of an omnibus approach to appropriations was
faced with two major disadvantages:
1. The entire appropriations package was held by the House until
all work was completed, and was forwarded to the Senate as one large
appropriation measure. This meant that .the Senate could not commence its
review until the House was finished, a procedure which contributed to un-
acceptable delays in funding national programs.
2. The omnibus concept did not provide the President the power of
"item veto." This meant that the President must withhold the entire
appropriations package if he objected to any part of it. This situation
would open the way for excessive legislative "riders" to be attached to




The Joint Committee on the Budget
Arthur Smithies said "the most serious and interesting attempt
to replace Section 138 (of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946)
was the McClellan Bill..." This bill provided for the establishment
of a fourteen member Joint Committee on the Budget, composed of seven
members from each appropriation committee.
On December 11, 1949, Senator McClellan announced his in-
tention of introducing legislation early in the second session of the
81st Congress to give Congress its own "budget bureau." He saw a need
for Congress to have more budget experts and investigators to effectively
2
weed out inefficiency and waste in the executive agencies.
The bill as sponsored by Senator McClellan provided for a
powerful joint committee whose functions included the following:
1. Inform itself on all matters relating to the President's budget.
2. Consider the President's Report on the State of the Union,
Economic Report, revenue estimates, and changing economic conditions.
3. Provide appropriations subcommittees with information to assist
in their work on each measure.
4. Report findings on budget estimates to the appropriations
commi ttees
.
5. Report to legislative committees to provide economy and
coordination between authorization and appropriations committees.
6. Compile cost estimates of all programs authorized by Congress.
^Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United
States
,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955), p. 96.
?The Washington Post , December 12, 1949.
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In effect, the bill would return centralized budgetary
authority' to the Congress, a move that was bitterly opposed by the
Executive Branch. The measure was also opposed by the Speaker of the
House, Representative Cannon, because of the proposal's invasion of
the constitutional prerogative of the House to initiate appropriations
bills. 1
No action was taken on the proposal during that session of
Congress, but hearings were conducted in 1951. In 1952, the bill passed
the Senate but failed to pass in the House. The Senate has passed some
form of the bill each year since 1952, but the House has never allowed
debate or vote on the proposals.
^Congressional Quarterly Service, Federal Economic
Policy
,




SIGNIFICANT REFORM MEASURES FROM 1950 - 1971
Perspective
Congress effectively discouraged any meaningful fiscal reforms
until 1970. During the period of the 1950's, the Senate attempted to
keep the idea of a Joint Budget Committee alive, but the House was
successful in killing each bill offered. In 1963, the Senate passed,
for the sixth time, a bill (S. 537) to establish a Joint Congressional
Committee on the Budget. The fourteen member committee would have an
expert staff to provide information on the budget, including data con-
cerning general revenues, to the Appropriations Committees. It would
also make suggestions to other committees on legislation in an effort
to promote greater efficiency and economy in the Government.
This bill was rejected by the House, but the pressure bearing
on the Congress to produce changes in the manner in which the budget was
reviewed and appropriations bills passed was reaching a peak. In 1963,
there was even a more serious appropriations delay than in previous years
By the beginning of December, five months after the financial year began,
Congress had cleared only four of twelve regular appropriations bills.
This increased pressure on Congress produced a new burst of
reform enthusiasm. A leader in this reform movement was Senator Joseph




joint committee on the organization of Congress, patterned after the
LaFollette - Monroney committee, to the election of committee chairmen
by secret ballot of committee members.
Senator Clark was perhaps the most persistent advocate of
Congressional reform, not only during 1963, but throughout the decade of
the Sixties. During this period he introduced no less than sixteen
specific proposals to modify the operations of the Senate and/or the
Congress. The most significant of these proposals, as they relate to
the appropriation process, are as follows:
1. Create a joint committee of Congress to study its organization
and operations and recommend improvement.
2. Provide that half of the appropriations bills be introduced by
Senators and that joint hearings be held on appropriations bills.
3. Provide that a majority of Senate conferees must favor the
Senate version of a bill on which the House and Senate disagree.
4. Permit each Senate standing committee to meet while the Senate
is in session at the will of the majority of the committee and not be
prevented from doing so by a single member.
5. Transfer selected functions from the Finance Committee to
several other Senate committees.
6. Urge Senate standing committees to report by July 4 all
legislative proposals of the Executive Branch.
7. Permit a majority of a committee to convene meetings, consider
any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee and end committee
debate on a measure.
Many of Senator Clark's proposals were sponsored by other
Senators, but his closest ally was Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.).
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Senator Clark's proposal in 1963, the establishment of a joint committee
to study Congressional operations and organization (S. Con. Res. 1 ) was
debated briefly by the Senate in December of that year, but died when a
filibuster was threatened on amendments to broaden the scope of the
proposed committee.
The mood of the Congress was definitely established by this
time, and it was now a matter of joining forces to push a reform measure
through both Houses. The year 1965 marked the commencement of a study
of the operations of Congress. During the 89th session of Congress, a
Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress was established and
marked the beginning of the first major attempt at Congressional reform
since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. The Joint Committee
was established only for the duration of the 89th Congress and was not
authorized to report legislation.
The Joint Committee held lengthy hearings during a five-month
period and heard 199 witnesses, including 106 Senators and Representatives
The Committee conducted interviews with Congressional staff personnel and
political scientists, evaluated published and unpublished Congressional
reorganization studies, and produced more than 2,300 pages of printed
record. The Joint Committee amassed more than 100 recommendations for
improving the legislative process.
On July 28, 1966, after seventeen months of study, the Joint
Committee issued a report containing its recommendations (H.Rept.1781
and S.Rept.1414). The Senate acted in 1966 to introduce legislation
containing the Joint Committee's recommendation (S. 3848), but the Con-
gress adjourned without taking any action.
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On January 16, 1967, Senator Monroney introduced a bill
(S.355) which contained most of the provisions of S. 3848. The report
of S.355 said that Congress faces a period of organizational crisis in
that policy problems had become more complex and that Congress had tended
to delegate authority to the Executive Branch. The report said that
reforms should be aimed at streamlining the ability of Congress to:
1. Comprehend legislative and budgetary proposals.
2. Maintain effective review of spending and of programs.
3. Keep Congressmen better informed.
4. Regulate the operations of Congress through a new permanent
Joint Committee on Congressional Operations.
5. Close loopholes in the lobby registration and reporting law.
The Senate's estimate of the cost of implementing these reform measures
was $5 million per year.
The measure died in the House Rules Committee at the end of
the 90th Congress.
In April 1969, the House Rules Committee appointed a special
subcommittee, chaired by Congressman B. F. Sisk (D., Calif.), held
hearings late in 1969, and the Rules Committee reported a reform bill
(HR 17654) on June 17, 1970. At this point, reform legislation was
assured and actions were rapidly completed:
1. September 17, 1970. HR 17654 passed the House by a roll-call
vote of 326 to 19. This became the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970,
2. October 6, 1970. The Senate passed HR 17654 by a roll-call vote
of 59 to 5.
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3. October 8, 1970. The House approved by voice vote the version
of the bill which the Senate had approved on October 6.
4. October 26, 1970. President Nixon signed HR 17654 (PL 91 - 510),
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.
This perspective on the general mood prevailing throughout
Congress during a span of nearly twenty years indicates the inertia that
traditionally restrains reform legislation. Historically, reform measures
are introduced by the Senate and killed by the House, usually because of
the opposition of the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.
Such reforms are confined to the internal operations of Congress, and
within Congress, enormous power has traditionally fallen to the Chairman
of the Appropriations Committee. As Representative Donald Rumsfeld told
his colleagues:
The difficulty with legislation like the Reorganization
Act for the Legislative Branch is that it really has no
constituency. It has no built-in lobby. It is a subject ,
matter that is essentially our responsibility as legislators.
An understanding of this lack of incentive to modify the internal
structures of Congress helps to explain why the decade of the Fifties was
void of any meaningful legislative reforms and why it took seven years
from the establishment of a joint committee to review the internal opera-
tions of Congress to the legislation of reforms that were recommended by
that committee.
During the period of the 1950' s, Congress was concerned with
problems other than fiscal. The defeat of the Omnibus Appropriations Bill
'Charles Rabb, "Obsolenscence on the Hill", The Nation
,
March 31, 1969, p. 391.
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and the Joint Budget Committee give evidence that the Congress was more
concerned with other of its internal operations. In 1953 the Republican
Congress was attempting to strengthen its control of committees by
increasing the size of the various committees. When the session opened
on January 3, 1953, the party breakdowns were as follows:
Senate: 48 Republicans, 47 Democrats, 1 Independent.
House: 221 Republicans, 211 Democrats, 1 Independent.
From the period 1954 through 1956, the Congress was deeply
involved in its investigative role. The House Un-American Activities
Committee under Chairman Velde (R, 111.) and the Senate Permanent In-
vestigations Subcommittee under Chairman McCarthy (R, Wis.) were each
under investigation by the respective Houses. The House Rules Subcommittee
on Legislation and the Senate Rules and Administration Subcommittee on
Rules were in search of a "fair play" code to govern Congressional in-
vestigations. Criticism had been directed toward the "one-man investigation"
and the alleged mistreatment of witnesses by certain committee chairmen.
During the period from 1957 through 1961, concern for reform
began to emerge. Senator Warren G. Magnuson (D., Wash.) introduced
legislation in the 85th and 86th Congress directed toward the problems
of the appropriations process. During 1961, the phrase "backdoor spending"
was used effectively by Congress to gain greater control over federal
finances. Although the phrase was never precisely defined, the term was
used to describe a variety of devices by which the agencies entered into
financial obligations over which Congress had limited control.
In 1962, a feud between the Senate and House Appropriations
Committees kept the Congress off balance through most of that session.
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This dispute, which had been growing for several years, centered on the
question of whether the Senate had the right under the Constitution to
initiate appropriations bills, and whether the Senate could add to House
passed appropriations bills funds for items either not previously considered
by the House or considered and turned down. Further, there was dispute
over where the Senate-House conference committees on appropriations bills
should meet, and by whom they should be chaired. The feud delayed final
action on appropriations bills for three months, and definitely set the
stage for reform legislation that would be proposed in 1963
The Fiscal Act of 1970
Senator Magnuson's perennial submission of a bill to provide for
a separate session of Congress for the consideration of appropriations
bills and to establish the calendar year as the fiscal year of the federal
government was submitted on November 4, 1969, under the title of "The
Fiscal Act of 1970". Senator Magnuson has introduced a bill into Congress
to accomplish these two things "every year of Congress for twenty years",'
but each bill has died without debate. The importance of this Act,
especially during the period from 1965 until the present, is that it
served to highlight the difficulties experienced by Congress in completing
action on appropriations bills, and as these difficulties continue to
expand, such an act could very well be legislated.
'Robert P. Hey, "Congress May Update Appropriation Machinery,
U. S. Agencies Clamor - How Much Can We Spend in 1970", The Christian
Science Monitor , December 16, 1969, in Congressional Record , CXV, S.
17745, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., December 23, 1969.
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Congress might be nearer to accepting such a proposed bill
than might be expected. It is interesting to note that the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970 had, at one stage in its development, a pro-
vision that incorporated the essentials of Senator Magnuson's bill. Even
more interesting, after the Legislative Reorganization Act was signed
into law, Senators William B. Saxbe (R., Ohio), Alan Cranston (D. , Calif.),
Richard S. Schweiker (R. , Pa.), and Harold E. Hughes (D. , Iowa) recom-
mended that the Senate consider changing from a fiscal to a calendar
year separating the budget and legislative sessions.
Because of the growing support for such changes and the potential
for Congressional recoupment of fiscal controls through the proposal, the
Fiscal Act of 1970 will be examined and analyzed.
Senator Magnuson's proposal (S 3113) before the 91st Congress
had three main sections:
1. Title I - Fiscal Sessions of the Congress.
2. Title II - Change of Fiscal Year.
3. Title III - Amendments to the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921.
Under Title I, the Congress would meet from January through
the first Monday in November in "legislative sessions". These sessions
would be devoted exclusively to passing new laws, examining federal programs,
and authorizing the maximum amount of funds they could be given. From the
second Monday in November through the end of December, Congress would meet
in "fiscal sessions". . . "for the purpose of considering bills and
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resolutions making for the support of the Government." The Act also
provides for the regular functioning of standing committees during both
sessions. Additionally, in the event of an emergency, the President
could advise Congress that immediate legislative action is warranted and
the Congress would be obliged to immediately consider the legislation.
Title II of the Act provides that the fiscal year of the
Treasury of the United States, in all matter of accounts, receipts,
expenditures, estimates and appropriations, would commence on January
1, 1973, and end on December 31, 1973. The bill further provides for
effecting the change in fiscal years by extending the fiscal year commenc-
ing on July 1, 1971 to December 31, 1972. Thereafter, the fiscal year
would run from January 1 through December 31.
Title III of the Act amends the provisons of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 that concern the President's schedule for submission
of the budget to Congress. The Act proposed that the budget be submitted
to Congress on or before July 15 of the year preceeding the commencement
of the fiscal year in lieu of the January 15 deadline now in effect. More
important than the change in submission dates of the budget is the require-
ment for the President to include in the submission an accounting of the
capital assets of the government. The accounting format was left to the
discretion of the President, but the requirement for a statement of assets
and their value at the end of each fiscal year was firm. This requirement
would certainly be subjected to intense negotiation and compromise since
^.S. Congress, Senate, Fiscal Act of 1970 (A Bill) .
S. 3113, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1969, p. 1.
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there is presently no accounting system in the federal government that
could produce such information.
The President's position on such a reform measure was outlined
in testimony by Philip S. Hughes, then the Deputy Director of the Bureau
of the Budget, on October 23, 1969. Mr. Hughes told the Congressional
Reorganization Subcommittee of the House Rules Committee:
In sum, we favor a change in the fiscal year, but believe
that the complexities and ramifications of such a change should be
carefully explored and planned for.'
Senator Magnuson, in an attempt to avoid having his bill die
in committee as it has on previous occasions, wrote to Senator B. Everett
Jordan, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration,
urging his prompt consideration. The letter, signed by nine Senators,
listed the forty co-sponsors of the bill and served to pressure the
chairman into acting on the proposal. On January 21, 1970, the Committee
on Rules and Administration discharged the bill and referred it to the
Committee on Government Operations. The measure was then routed to the
Executive Branch for comments, and died in committee.
The fiscal year issue is deeply rooted in American history.
When the country was first formed, the fiscal year ran from January to
January, and Congressmen would arrive in December for the legislative
session. The country was young, small and uncomplicated, and the
appropriation process was short and could be accomplished in a month.
In the early 1800' s it began to take longer. In 1843, Congress changed
the fiscal year to the present July 1 to June 30 period in order to give
'Hey, "Congress May Update Appropriation Machinery",
The Christian Science Monitor , in Congressional Record , CXV,
S. 17746, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., December 23, 1969.
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itself several months to conduct its business and carefully consider
appropriations. In recent years, this has not been enough time, because
the country has become more populous, government bigger, and society
more complicated.
Senator Magnuson and his co-sponsors surely realize the
difficulties of breaking tradition, especially in the Senate, yet it is
just as certain that Senator Magnuson will introduce his bill again in
the 92nd Congress for the twenty-first time.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970
On October 20, 1970, President Nixon signed into law the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (HR 17654, PL 91-510). Passage
of the legislative reform bill climaxed a five-year effort by the Congress
to streamline its operations and organization. The major aspects of the
Act include:
1. Improvement of the operations of Congress, in committee and
on the floor.
2. Providing Congress with better means of evaluating the federal
budget.
3. Improved resources for research and information.
The Legislative Reorganization Act did not produce the sweeping
changes that many reform advocates desired. Specifically, the Act did
not modify the senority system, despite attempts on July 27, 1970, by
Respresentatives Schwengel (R., Iowa), Reuss (D. , Wis.), and Bingham
(D., N. Y. ), and on October 6, 1970, by Senators Mathias (R. , Md.),
Baker (R. , Tenn.), and Packwood (R., Ore.) to do so. The major concern
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of the Congressmen was the manner in which a committee chairman was
selected and the permanency of the appointment. Most reformists
favored election of the chairman by majority vote of the committee
members for a specified term.
The Act opens to the public eye more of the operations of
Congress by changing procedures so that positions taken by Congressmen
on various bills and amendments will be revealed publicly with greater
frequency. Additionally, the Act allows radio and television coverage
of committee hearings in the House, a provision that existed for the
Senate under previous procedures.
The Legislative Reorganization Act provides for a modernized
processing system for federal fiscal and budgetary data, more opportunity
for Congress to oversee the costs of various programs, increased assistance
for Congressional committees, and a Joint Committee on Congressional
Operations to continue to study the functioning of Congress.
The specific provisions of the Act that relate to this study
are those under Title II, Fiscal Controls, but it is both informative
and necessary to examine the entire Act in order to gain a full under-
standing of the scope of its reforms and provide insight into the measure
of added budgetary control that might shift to the Congress.
The movement for reform that began in 1963 with Senator Clark's
proposal for the establishment of a joint committee to study the organiza-
tion of Congress began to take form in 1965 when the Congress finally
decided to authorize the establishment of the committee. The membership
was set at twelve, evenly divided between the House and Senate. The
resolution (S. Con. Res. 2) establishing the Joint Committee gave it specific
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authority to study and make recommendations on a variety of subjects,
including the following:
1. Relationship between the House and Senate.
2. Relationship between the Congress and other branches of
government.
3. Salaries of members of Congress and Congressional staff
employees.
4. The structure and relationship between committees.
There was little opposition to the establishment of the
Joint Committee, although some members in both Houses felt the committee
should not be restricted from making recommendations regarding rules,
parliamentary procedure, practices and precedents of the Senate or the
House.
The May 31, 1965 issue of The Nation published an editorial
concerning the newly created Joint Committee and the restrictions placed
on that committee:
Both houses this spring approved the establishment of a joint
committee to study the reform of Congressional organization and
operation. But the resolution, introduced by Senator Mike Monroney
of Oklahoma, contained a stipulation that the joint committee steer
clear of "roles, parliamentary procedure, practices and/or pre-
cedents" and "consideration of any matter on the floor" of either
the Senate or the House. Senators Joseph Clark, a reformist
gadfly, and Hugh Scott, joined forces to argue that the very areas
precluded from the study "constitute the strong and endless red tape
which bind the Congress and prevent action when action is needed.
There is not much else worth investigating."!
Senator Monroney 1 s position was upheld by a Senate vote of
58 to 29, and he was subsequently made the Senate's chief delegate
] The Nation
,
May 31, 1965, p. 581.
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and co-chairman of the Joint Committee. House Speaker McCormack
(D. , Mass.) named Representative Ray J. Madden (D. , Ind.) as co-
chairman for the House.
The Committee held hearings on Congressional reform between
May 10 and September 23, 1965, taking testimony first from members of
Congress and then from political scientists, representatives of various
organizations, and persons with special interests in or knowledge of
reform. The Joint Committee filed its report in 1966, and the Senate
passed a bill (S 355) in 1967 embodying most of the Committee's
recommendations.
Although some minor changes were made in the Senate's original
version of the bill, the 1969 House bill (HR 17654) that ultimately
became the Legislative Reorganization Act contained most of the es-
sentials of the Joint Committee's recommendations and the Senate's
original version. Among those provisions which did not survive the
legislative process were:
1. Elimination of proxy voting in committees.
2. The requirement that appropriations hearings, except those
involving national security, be open.
3. The requirement that all votes on appropriations bills be
roll-call votes.
In the area of fiscal controls provided under the Act, Congress
attempted to gain a broader view of fiscal policy and gain the capability
of analyzing the total impact of federal expenditures. The major pro-
visions contained under Title II, Fiscal Controls, are as follows:
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1. Directed the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget to set up and maintain a standardized
data processing system for budgetary and fiscal data.
2. Directed the Secretary and Director to furnish to Congressional
committees, upon request, information on the location and nature of
available data on federal programs, activities, receipts and expenditures.
3. Provided that the President should send Congress five-year
forecasts of the fiscal impact of ewery new or existing federal program.
4. Provided that the President should update the budget for the
next fiscal year at midyear and transmit to Congress a supplemental
summary of those revisions by June 1 each year.
5. Provided that the Appropriations Committee of the House should,
within thirty days after the President sends the budget to Congress,
hold hearings.
6. Required that committee reports on all measures include
five-year cost estimates for the programs affected, excluding both
Appropriations Committees.
Viewing the Act as a whole, the modest changes legislated do
little to modify the internal operations of the Congress. The added
fiscal controls could be the first step in prying Congress away from a
fragmented approach to the budget, but the committee system under which
the budget review is conducted and appropriations bills passed is not
significantly affected.
Additional reforms in Senate procedures and operations have
been proposed, but the House is not likely to welcome additional measures.
The changes made by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 were pro-




EFFECTIVENESS OF REFORMS ATTEMPTED
Overview
In attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of the fiscal
reforms that Congress has either legislated or seriously considered,
it is not sufficient merely to judge a measure effective or ineffective.
It is vital to an enlightened evaluation of reform attempts to recognize
the conservative nature of Congress as an institution, an institution
that characteristically resists change. As this study might indicate,
Congress is, however, not immune to change. Congress accepts reforms
slowly, cautiously and in piecemeal fashion, a pace that does not
satisfy those reformers who press for b.old changes, but does satisfy
the need of Congress, as a body, to implement reforms.
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's (D., Mont.) observa-
tions in 1963 concerning Congressional reforms probably expresses the
view of a majority of the members of Congress:
Attempts are made to reform or to speed it (Congress) up.
But somehow or other it is able to take care of its legislation
and look after the interests of the country, and individual
Senators are able to look after the interests of their states
as well. Now there is a need for some reforms, but I certainly
do not think we ought to act hastily. Some reforms are needed;
very few. These reforms will come in time, but they will not
come overnight
J
^ Congress and the Nation
,
(Washington, D. C: Congressional




A variety of factors has contributed to past reforms of
Congress, and these factors can generally be categorized as follows:
1. The continually shifting distribution of power within Congress.
2. Recurring efforts to guarantee that Congress properly re-
presents the nation and fulfills its responsibilities.
3. The expanding functions of government, especially in the
Executive Branch.
The control of the executive has continued to be an area of
major concern to Congress. Congress generally regards the power of
the purse as a principal means of controlling the Executive Branch
and has made repeated efforts to strengthen Congressional control by
strengthening its power over the use of federal funds.
Until Appropriations Committees were set up in the House
(1865) and Senate (1857), one committee in each house had handled both
revenue and spending legislation. In 1885, the House spread the powers
of its Appropriations Committees among nine committees, and the Senate,
two years later, spread appropriations powers among its legislative
committees. Although this division of responsibility allowed committees
most familar with a subject to consider pertinent appropriations, it
resulted in decentralization so complete that no unified consideration
or control of fiscal policy was possible.
In 1920, the House restored exclusive spending powers to its
Appropriation Committee. Congress sought to centralize fiscal manage-
ment of the Administration directly under the President and in 1921
passed the Budget and Accounting Act.
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The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
Under the Act, Congress authorized the establishment of the
Bureau of the Budget as a staff arm of the President to assist him in
the preparation of the annual budget and any supplemental or deficiency
estimates and to assist the President in securing greater economy and
efficiency in the Executive Branch. As a congressional counterweight
to the Bureau of the Budget, the Act provided for the establishment of
the General Accounting Office. This provision was designed to strengthen
Congressional oversight of fiscal policy and spending.
• Before World War I, neither the expenditures nor the revenues
of the federal government exceeded $800 million. Having seen expenditures
reach $18.5 billion in fiscal 1919 at the height of the war, and having
appropriated $6.5 billion for fiscal 1920, the first postwar year,
Congress decided it must reorganize its. financial machinery, both to
retrench expenditures and to tighten control over fiscal policy.
The role of the General Accounting Office failed to develop
as the Congress envisioned. The functions performed by GAO were limited
to those of a post-audit nature. This audit function neither tested the
validity and consequences of plans, programs and policies, nor promoted
discussions in these areas, nor projected the consequences of alternative
courses of action.
The House Appropriations Committee's reluctance to allow the
GAO a pre-audit budgetary role further diluted the effectiveness of that
office as a counterweight to the Bureau of the Budget. The House
Appropriations Committee was reluctant to develop a role for GAO, because
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it had no control over that office and preferred to develop its own
staff in the review of the President's budget.
The attempt of Congress to recapture control and coordination
over money bills by reverting to the single Appropriations Committees
in each House was not as successful as anticipated. The President's
budget was still broken down into numerous pieces and assigned to various
subcommittees for review, hearings, and recommendations to the full
committee. The piecemeal and fragmented review process continued as
before, and the budget was not received as an overall financial plan by
Congress. The subcommittees functioned as autonomous, independent units
subject to little control or coordination by the full committees and
parent bodies. James MacGregor Burns, in Presidential Government
,
evaluated the effort by Congress to re-establish a single, coordinated
committee for appropriations review:
The Congressional effort to integrate its own appropriation
activities was largely abortive; especially in the House, the new
Appropriations Committee spawned subcommittees that operated with
almost the same mutual tolerance and independence as had the
separate appropriations committees before 1 920.
^
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 appears now to have
made the Executive Branch stronger in budgetary control in comparison
to Congress, but this is not to imply that the Act was ineffective in
restoring some measure of budgetary control to Congress. What appears
to have happened is that the gains realized by the Executive Branch were
not matched by Congressional gains.
Ijohn S. Saloma, The Responsible Use of Power
,
(Washington,
D. C: American Enterprise Institution, 1964), p. 42.
2james MacGregor Burns, Presidential Government: The Crucible
of Leadership
,
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 71.
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In assessing the Act in terms of shifts in budgetary in-
fluence and control, it is important to note that this Act was the
first significant reform attempt by Congress in 132 years. In a
short-term assessment, the greater gains were in the Executive Branch,
but the long-term gains may be those that set the mood for further
reform. In summary, the gains for Congress may have been the recogni-
tion of the imbalance of power between the two branches, and the
dawning of the era of the reform.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
Congress was beginning to feel the one-sided effect of the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The added power and control that
was afforded the President during the years of World War II prompted
the Congress to again review its operations and organization.
The Act reduced the number of standing committees to one
half -- to fifteen in the Senate and nineteen in the House, but sub-
committees proliferated. The Act further directed each standing
committee to exercise continuing watchfulness over the Executive
Agencies under their jurisdication. This attempt to maintain oversight
was further strengthened by the provision for a "legislative budget."
Attempts to implement the legislative budget in 1947, 1948
and 1949 failed or were ineffective. One of the principal reasons
for its failure was the inability of the Congress to make accurate
estimates of spending so early in the session and before individual
agency requests were considered in detail. Another reason for the failure
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was Congress' practice of passing appropriations bills separately
without strict control on total outlays.
The Act authorized each standing committee to increase its
professional staff, and it is this provision that has proven the most
beneficial to Congress. The increase in professional staff has enabled
Congress to increase its influence and control over Executive Branch
activities and operations.
The significance of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946 is that it was an expression of congressional concern over the
imbalance of power between the Legislative and Executive Branches and
an attempt to restore equilibrium. Although the real innovation of
the Act, the Legislative Budget, was a failure, it signified Congres-
sional recognition of its responsibilities to relate federal expenditures
and revenues.
The Employment Act of 1946
Under the Employment Act of 1946, the Congress established
the Council of Economic Advisors to assist the President in setting
fiscal policy and in the preparation of the budget. The congressional
counterweight was the establishment of the Joint Economic Committee.
The establishment of the Joint Economic Committee might
well prove to be the most effective budgetary reform measure attempted
in recent history. The JEC, as an advisory committee, cannot force
its views on the members of Congress, and must resort to thorough
investigation of various areas in which it is concerned, solid
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justification for its recommendations, and complete integration with
the other members and committees of Congress. Only through a reputa-
tion of being an informed committee can the JEC formulate positions
and recommendations that are acceptable to Congress. The benefits that
accrue from such a committee must necessarily be those that are pro-
duced over the long run.
The true value of the JEC is centered in its educational
function for the various committees of Congress. The benefits derived
from this education of Congress must be considered long-term benefits,
and it will aid in understanding the effectiveness of the JEC to examine
some of these benefits.
In analyzing attempts by Congress to gain more control over
the allocation of the nation's resources, some of the most prevailing
reasons for its lack of success including the following:
1. Lack of receiving a budget from the President that specifies
the total program.
2. Lack of an effective means of analyzing the budget in terms
of costs versus benefits.
3. The absence of a consolidated, integrated approach to the
implications of fiscal policy, including a single body to consider
and recommend to the Congress alternative proposals.
For purposes of this study, attention will focus on the JEC's effective-
ness in these problem areas.
The Employment Act stipulated that the President's Economic
Report was to be more than a review of past performance, programs and
policies. The Act specified that the report would include "a program
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for carrying out the policy declared (in the Act) together with such
recommendations for legislation as he (the President) may deem
necessary or desirable.'
The JEC was critical of the President's report for not
complying with this requirement of the Act, and in its annual Joint
Economic Report freely brought this to the attention of the Executive
Branch, Members of Congress, and the public. In its 1965 report,. the
committee made the following observations:
Practice and developments in recent years have either
departed from, or fallen short of this requirement. We have
witnessed the submission of a number of messages each year
containing recommendations on parts of the program. While
this practice has certain advantages in drawing attention to
individual legislative proposals, it tends to obscure the
outlines of the administration's entire economic program.
We can understand the difficulties of presenting early in the
Congress a completely rounded legislative program, but the
requirement for the prompt development of national policy
each year makes the submission of such a program imperative.
The President today submits a more complete budget in terms
of overall programs and its effect on the total economy. The budget
also includes current levels of production and unemployment and
projects those levels of production needed to carry out the policy
declared in the Employment Act. This development can be attributed,
in some measure, to the pressures mounted by the Congress which resulted
from the persistence of the Joint Economic Committee.
' Employment Act of 1946 , Statutes at Large, LX, Sec. 23,
(1969), p. 1.
^U. S. Congress, House, 1965 Joint Economic Report
,
H. Rept. 175, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 3.
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The JEC, in its analysis of the President's report, continues
to stress the cost-benefit relationships of expenditures proposed.
This analysis is central in the broad question of assignment of national
priorities by seeking a determination of the dollar costs required
to attain primary social goals and the resulting trade off of national
defense. Examples of the committee's involvement in the area of cost
benefit and assignment of national priorities can be found in the 1970
Joint Economic Report . The report recommends that Congress should
reorder the national priorities outlined in the President's budget for
FY71 by reduction of programs that are out of proportion to the benefits
anticipated, and increase expenditures for social and human resource
programs that promise higher relative benefits.
The Joint Economic Committee appears to be performing its
function of considering the President's budget in a consolidated manner
and gaining an overview of the total effect of the proposals offered.
The committee goes into great detail through subcommittee hearings and
investigations, and the resulting subcommittee reports provide a vast
amount of detailed information for use by the several legislative
committees of Congress. As an indication of the scope of the Joint
Economic Report , the 1970 report discussed and made recommendations
in the following areas:
1. The Economic Outlook.
2. Fiscal Policy.
3. Monetary and Financial Developments.
4. Improving the Structure of the Economy.
5. National Priorities.
6. International Economic Issues.
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Some of the recommendations and views of the JEC contained
in the 1970 report provides further insight into the nature of the
committee and how it may influence decisions that determine the areas
and levels of expenditure:
1. The need to development contingency programs if anti-
inflationary economic policies induce continuing unemployment or
recession.
2. To Identify and bring to public attention those sectors of
the economy where economic inefficiencies and resource shortages
create inflationary pressures, and promote responsible action to correct
the condition.
3. The Administration needs to implement procedures to promote
the flow of credit to the private housing sector.
4. There are serious disadvantages to direct wage and price
controls. Indirect controls or guideposts are more desirable.
The logic supporting these views and recommendations are
broadly stated in the report but are further substantiated by the
detailed subcommittee reports.
The charter of the Joint Economic Committee spans a wide
range of areas and is essentially free to focus upon all government
programs. It is this broad scope that gives the committee such
prominence and prestige. The committee crosses the several lines of
Congressional activity, providing information and alternatives to the
legislative committees.
The final area to be discussed regarding the effectiveness
of the Joint Economic Committee will focus upon a specific program
that has been before the American public for several years . . . the
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economic-political issue of the Supersonic Transport. The 1970 Joint
Economic Report said "we urge prompt action to reduce or eliminate
expenditures for the supersonic transport . . ."J To further
emphasize this particular program, the Subcommittee on Economy in
Government, chaired by Senator William Proxmire, issued a Federal
Transportation Pxeport in August, 1970, for the purpose of providing
Congress with the latest results of the subcommittee's study and
recommendation. Views expressed in this report were completely negative
toward continued support of the SST program:
Few significant public benefits appear likely to result
from the supersonic transport (SST) development program.
On "the other hand, very significant social costs are associated
with this program. More productive use of government resources
are clearly available. No further federal financial support of
the supersonic transport development program is justified at
this time.
2
On December 3, 1970, the Senate voted 52 to 41 to halt
federal funding of the SST (but Senate •subcommitte on March 18, 1971,
voted for it after the House voted against it). Senator Proxmire analyzed
the Senate's reversal of its previous support for the SST as follows:
The big reason for the turnaround was environment. This
was the big issue - the disclosures of the past year that the
SST posed a tremendous potential threat of air pollution ^nd
noise pollution. And the priority argument helped, too (referring
to the case made by opponents that the government has to take a
new look at where money goes at a time when domestic social pro-
grams are being squeezed).^
1|J. S. Congress, House, 1970 Joint Economic Report
,
H. Rept 972, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, p. 39.
^U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Report of the
Subcommittee on Economy in Government on Federal Transportation
Expenditure , Joint Committee Print, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, p. 2.
^David Hoffman, "Senate Votes Down SST Funds," The
Washington Post , December 4, 1970, p. 1.
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The significance of this specific case is not whether the
SST program continues, but the indication of the potential influence
that the committee possesses. As more information is made available
to Congress and members are shown acceptable alternative courses of
action, control over federal expenditures can increase proportionally.
The real value of the JEC may not have yet reached its peak.
The committee exerts some measure of influence over the committees it
serves and the prestige of membership on the committee is rising.
Ernest S. Griffith, in Congress , expresses this view of the Joint
Economic Committee:
The JEC serves the vital function of preserving the
opportunity and practice whereby Congress may formulate
alternatives and assumes the lead in the areas where it
feels that the executive is dilatory or in error.
1
In summary, the Employment Act of 1946 has enabled Congress
to regain some measure of budgetary influence and control from the
Executive Branch. The Joint Economic Committee offers promise of
providing Congress increased influence and control over federal ex-
penditures and fiscal policy.
The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950
Although the provisions of this Act were never successfully
implemented, it did provide the vehicle for continuing criticism of the
President's budget. It kept alive the reformists' desires to exercise
1 Ernest S. Griffith, Congress: Its Contemporary Role
,
(New York: University Press, 1956) , p. 145.
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closer congressional control over the fiscal policy of the nation, and
bridged the gap in the reform movement from 1947 until passage by the
Senate in 1952 of the Joint Committee on the Budget.
The effectiveness of the Omnibus Appropriations Act must neces-
sairly be appraised in terms other than those of recoupment of control
from the Executive Branch. In summary, the Act succeeded in keeping the
reform movement alive by providing Congress with possible alternative
means of increasing its influence in a budgetary role.
In viewing this attempt at budgetary reform in the short term,
the Act must be considered a failure. In a broader view of its impact,
the Act" produced such controversy and discussion in the area of budgetary
reform that its measure of success must be judged in relation to its
role in the continuing struggle between Congress and the Executive. In
the long term analysis of budgetary reform, the Omnibus Appropriations
Act occupies a small, but significant,, position.
The Joint Committee on The Budget
The effectiveness of this attempt must be appraised in much
the same manner as the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950. Although
the provisions of the Joint Committee on the Budget have yet to be
enacted into law, it serves to spark the Senate with the hope of
additional budgetary control. The fact that the Senate continues to
pass some form of this bill each year serves to pressure the House for
an added measure of control and also serves notice on the Executive
Branch that the issue of budgetary reform is still alive.
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The concept of the Joint Committee on the Budget incorporates
the advantages of a committee similar to the Joint Economic Committee
but expands those functions to include legislative review. Emphasis
on this type of function lends increased importance to the Joint Economic
Committee, an effect that sponsors increased prominence to the JEC and
results in a better informed Congress.
In summary, the effectiveness of this reform measure must be
judged in terms of the subsidary results produced. Even though the
reform has not been implemented as Senator McClellan would like, the
continuing pressure by the Senate has produced secondary benefits --
benefits that contribute to the continuing movement for budgetary
reform.
The Fiscal Act of 1970
Senator Magnuson's proposal to divide the congressional
sessions into two sections, one for legislation and the other for
appropriations, is designed to make the Congress more efficient and
effective. The Act is meaningful because of its expression of concern
for the lack of an effective means of reviewing the President's budget
within the time frame currently established. The Act is another of
the continuing expressions of the need to effect budgetary reforms
in order to provide positive legislative oversight.
The benefits that have been predicted to result from
Senator Magnuson's bill were summarized by Senator Mansfield:
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With these proposals in operation, perhaps we could do
our job a little more effectively and be able to spend the
time we should on both types of measures - that is, the
authorization and the appropriation bills.'
The effect of the Fiscal Act of 1970 is to increase the pressure within
Congress to put the business of financing the government on a more
businesslike basis.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970
The effect of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and
its reform measures will be determined by the extent to which Congressional
operations adhere to the provisions contained in the Act. The major
impact of the Act is concentrated in the area of committee procedures
and provides for:
1. Less secrecy surrounding the position of members on various
issues.
2. Recording of teller votes taken in the (House) Committee of
the Whole.
3. Roll-call votes taken in committee to be made public.
4. Television and/or radio coverage of House committee hearings.
The extent that budgetary control is returned to Congress will
be determined by the operations of the committees that review the budget.
Thus, the effectiveness of the Act in providing Congress additional
December 23, 1969.
Congressional Record , CXV, S. 17744, 91st Cong., 2nd sess.,
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budgetary control rest with the effectiveness of the reforms in
committee operations. So long as the power of the committees remains
in the hands of a few senior members, the impact of the Act can be
offset by simply ignoring the changes.
Committees form the brain of Congress, and the role of
committees has become crucial in the successful reform of the budgetary
system. Since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 failed to
modify the seniority system which is used in the selection of committee
chairmen, the committees are likely to continue to offer the same
obstacles to budgetary reforms. Recognizing the need to modify the
seniority system if reform of the committee operations is to be
successful, Congressman Henry S. Reuss (D., Wis.) offered an amendment
to the proposed House bill that provided that seniority need not be the
only consideration in selecting committee chairmen. The amendment was
rejected by the House, and after the passage of the bill into law,
Congressman Reuss made this observation:
While the Act will be of great help, particularly in the
elimination of secrecy by allowing teller votes, its failure
to do anything about the seniority rule makes it a matter of
limited usefulness.
'
The effectiveness of this Act in providing additional
budgetary control for Congress depends on the operations of the
committees of Congress, and how closely the intent of the Act is
followed. The powerful House Appropriations Committe is not like to
risk dilution of its strength and influence by changing its operations,
Congressional Quarterly Service, Congressional Quarterly ,
(Washington, D. C: Congressional Quarterly Service,
December 25, 1970), p. 3064.
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and the struggle within Congress to effect redistribution of con-
centrated power will undoubtedly diminish the potential transfer of




Summary of Reform Success
This study has concentrated on the struggles between the
Legislative and Executive Branches in the area of budgetary control.
The shift of budgetary influence and control from the Legislative to
the Executive Branch has been traced, with emphasis placed on the
efforts of Congress to regain some measure of control over fiscal
policy.
The importance of the locus of this fiscal control is
readily apparent when the nature of the national budget is considered.
The budget today embodies decisions of. vast impact and importance.
It not only proposes how the nation should channel its monetary re-
sources, but commits its manpower and natural resources, not only for
the current fiscal year, but for the ensuing years that constitute the
life of a plan or program.
It has been estimated that Congress spends nine-tenths of
its time struggling with spending issues. This suggests that the
greatest potential for Congressional oversight of the Executive Branch
lies in the appropriation process, and perhaps explains the recurring
reforms that have been attempted to counterbalance the advantages
shifting to the Executive.
'Robert Ash Wallace, Congressional Control of Federal
Spending
,




As early as 1795, Congress found it must legislate the
requirement that unexpended balances be returned to the Treasury
in a surplus account to prevent the Executive from carrying these
funds forward into a new fiscal year and applying them to current
appropriations.
Following closely behind this restrictive legislation,
Congress was faced with the executive practice of deficiency
appropriations, a move to force the Congress to fund programs con-
sidered essential by the President. Thus the struggle for fiscal
control began, a struggle that continues today.
Until recently, each of the attempted budgetary reforms has
been aimed at restoring the Legislative and Executive balance by
curbing and weakening the Executive Branch:
1. The reforms of 1921 were centered in the establishment of
the General Accounting Office, a move to check the advantages offered
the Executive via the Bureau of the Budget.
2. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 attempted to
weaken the Executive's control through the concept of the Legislative
Budget.
3. The establishment of the Joint Economic Committee was clearly
a move to lessen the impact of the President's Council of Economic
Advisors, and provide a congressional vehicle for finding the "soft
spots" in the President's budget.
4. Both the Omnibus Appropriation Act and the Joint Committee




The Fiscal Act of 1970 and the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1970 each show promise of a movement away from the past reforms, and
concentrate on the internal operations of Congress. The Fiscal Act would
provide for a separate fiscal session to allow Congress sufficient time
to consider and debate the fiscal policies proposed by the President, while
the Legislative Reorganization Act concentrates mainly on congressional
committee operations.
The need for this shift in the direction of the reform
movement was expressed in 1966 by Theodore C. Sorensen in the
Saturday Review :
As this country has become more urbanized, industrialized,
and internationalized, it has experienced a necessary increase
in the role of the Executive. The fluidity and complexity
of national problems require all the initiative and discretion
the White House can properlv be given. The answer to the
present imbalance (of power) lies not in reducing its voice
to the level of the Legislative Branch, but in strengthening
the voice of the latter -- streamlining its procedures,
elevating its debates, permitting its majorities to be felt,
safeguarding its ethics and honor.'
It appears that this is the type of reform that the 1970
measures seek. Certainly Title II of the Legislative Reorganization
Act does produce some shift in budgetary control to the Congress, but
the emphasis of the Act is inward, toward the internal structure and
operations of Congress.
When the internal structure of Congress is the object of
reform, this presents another problem in itself. The chief obstacle
in this type of reform is found in the House Appropriations Committee,
a committee that seeks to retain its power and influence, not only
Theodore C. Sorensen, "Reforming Congress", Saturday
Review, July 16, 1966, p. 22.
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within the House, but relative to its postion over the Senate as
well. Fenno has appraised this House-Senate struggle as follows:
To the degree that House Committee members believe
they now enjoy pre-eminence, they will oppose changes in
the appropriations process which they perceive as increasing
the relative influence of the Senate J
Each of the reforms attempted by Congress has had some
measure of effectiveness, either directly or indirectly. Certainly
the major reforms of 1921 and 1946 had direct effect on the Executive
and served to strengthen the Legislative Branch. The effectiveness
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 remains to be determined,
yet the ultimate recoupment of fiscal control by Congress under this
measure depends on how closely the provisions of the Act are followed.
Since the Civil War, Congress has been in a position of
having to catch up with the executive -- to impose double-bladed
legislation designed to check the Administration and further the
cause of Congress. This was the situation when the Joint Economic
Committee was established in 1946, but this counter-balancing committee
appears to be one of the most effective products of reform that Congress
has implemented.
In the absence of essential institutional changes, the future
strengthening of the congressional role in setting fiscal policy seems
to depend upon its ability to analyze the President's fiscal proposals
and generate alternatives for those it finds unacceptable. This has
become the most imDortant function of the JEC, a function that it
] The Power of the Purse, p. 628 - 629.
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performs consistently well. But while the Joint Economic Committee
is influential, it lacks the power of a legislative committee, and
its effectiveness is somewhat diminished. Regardless, it generally
serves as the congressional voice on economic policy matters and provides
detailed information on the Administration's budget plans.
In appraising the effectiveness of the reforms that have
been attempted by Congress, it is the observation of the writer that
they have largely produced either neutral or negative results.
Undoubtedly there were immediate, short- run benefits from most of the
measures, but, viewing with hindsight, the gains were soon offset by
continuing executive dominance. This cycle is likely to continue
unless Congress can, through its collective leadership, successfully
bridge and combine the power of the House and Senate.
It is because of this division of power and separate
constituencies that Congress has been unable to compete with the
executive, who has concentrated power and basically answers to the
American people as a whole. It appears that the reforms attempted
by Congress have generally failed to produce long-run gains because
they were directed at checking the President rather than being
directed at the causes of the loss of budgetary control.
Prospects for Reform
As this study shows, Congress has been inclined to seek
reforms since the early 1900' s. Such an attitude on the part of
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Congress strengthens the probability of increasing its fiscal role,
but the' obstacles to meaningful reform must be overcome if reforms
are to result in a permanent increase in budgetary influence and control.
Responding to ever increasing executive initiative, Congress
has produced many reform measures, only two of which concentrated on
its internal problems. Yet, it is this type of problem to which
Congress must address itself if it is to effect a favorable, permanent
shift of budgetary control. The key obstacle to successful fiscal
reform is found in Congress itself. The House Appropriations Committee
now enjoys unparalleled prominence in Congress, and any proposal which
seeks to reduce its control over federal spending is assured of death
in committee. Congress, then, bears the responsibility for failure
to develop an enlarged budgetary role, for only Congress can change
its procedures and operations. The Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970 made minor, if not insignificant,- procedural changes, but failed
to touch the heart of the problem. If Congress reasonably expects to
regain budgetary control and assume a more prominent role in formulating
national fiscal policy, it must significantly alter its internal
structure.
This restructuring process will not, however, ensure Congress
of the role it seeks. In the word of Saloma:
... it should be clear that any reforms that are
introduced will only be as effective as the Congress makes
them. Revising the congressional calendar, creating a new
joint coordinating committee, providing Congress the
necessary staff and information to make intelligent judgments
on the budget, etc., will not in themselves give Congress the
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effective role it seeks. The basic limitation is one of
self-education and self-discipline.'
The drive for budgetary reforms has, in all probability,
been satisfied by the modest changes made by the 1970 Reorganization
Act. The Senate is likely to continue its efforts to legislate
reforms and the House is likely to avoid the issue. The centers
of power in the House are not likely to approve those reforms that
effectively redistribute its powers, and the chairmen of the House
and Senate are certain to oppose a change in the seniority system.
There is a movement, however, among the junior Congressmen to bring
about reforms to the seniority system of selecting committee chairmen,
but until this change occurs, prospects for meaningful reform are not
encouraging.
Some reform measures will be offered during the Ninety-
Second Congress. Senator Magnuson is again preparing a "fiscal year"
bill and, according to the Senator's legislative staff assistant, the
proposal will be submitted during the first session of the Ninety-
Second Congress. Senator Magnuson reportedly has a total of forty-
five co-sponsors for the bill, and the prospects for favorable Senate
2
action is considered good.
The prospects for positive Congressional action depends on
the leadership in the House. In the past, House bills dealing with
changing the fiscal year have remained in the Committee on Government
Operations without hearings, and the chances that a Senate bill will
^ The Responsible Use of Power , p. 75.
2samuel Spina, Legislative Staff Assistant for Senator
Magnuson (D. , Wash.), personal interview on March 15, 1970.
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survive where a similar House bill did not are not very good. In
all probability, when the House Appropriations Committee decides to
support such a change, the House will favorably, and quickly, report
it.
The Senate is likely to pursue procedural reforms that
continue along the lines of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970. Senators Saxbe, Cranston, Schweiker, and Hughes have indicated
that there was considerable agreement within the Senate supporting
some procedural reforms. Included among the most significant of these
measures to which the Senators refer are:
1. A set date (May 31 and July 31 have been suggested) after
which the Senate would not consider authorization bills.
2. Beginning of Senate committee action on appropriations bills
prior to House passage, including a tentative markup session on the
bill by the Senate Appropriations Committee.
Congress has, in the past, been unable to initiate compre-
hensive budgetary studies or originate fiscal policy, yet the reforms
attempted are directed at curbing these functions given to the executive.
The question naturally arises whether the pendulum of power will
eventually swing back to Congress, and such a question is impossible
to answer. However, in the short-term view, it appears to the writer
that the executive will continue to dominate in the area of budgetary
control, and Congress, especially the Senate, will continue in its





Acheson, Dean. A Citizen Looks at Congress . New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1957.
Bailey, Stephen K. Congress Makes a Law . New York: Columbia
University Press, 1950.
Berle, Adolf A. The American Economic Republic . New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1963.
Bernstein, Marver H. The Job of the Federal Executive . Washington,
D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1958.
Burkhead, Jesse. Government Budgeting . New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc. , 1956.
Clark, Joseph S. Congressional Reform - Problems and Prospects .
New York: Thomas Y. Crowe! 1 Company, 1965.
Donham, Philip, and Fahey, Robert J. Congress Needs Help . New
York: Random House, 1966.
Fenno, Richard F. , Jr. The Power of the Purse - Appropriations
Politics in Congress . Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1966.
Galloway, George B. Reform of the Federal Budget . Washington, D. C.
The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service.
Public Affairs Bulletin Number 80, 1950.
Griffith, Ernest S. Congress - Its Contemporary Role . New York:
New York University Press, 1956.
Harris, Joseph P. Congress and the Legislative Process . New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967.
. Congressional Control of Administration . Washington, D. C,
The Brookings Institution, 1964.
Keating, Kenneth B. Government of the People . New York: The




Saloma, John S., III. The Responsible Use of Power . Washington,
D. C: American Enterprise Institution, 1964.
Schultze, Charles L. The Politics and Economics of Public Spending .
Washington, D. C. : The Brookings Institution, 1968.
Smithies, Arthur. The Budgetary Process in the United States .
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955.
Vinyard, Dale. Congress . New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968.
Wallace, Robert Ash. Congressional Control of Federal Spending .
Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960.
Wildavsky, Aaron. The Politics of the Budgetary Process . Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1964.
Young, Roland. The American Congress . New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1958.
Congress: The First Branch of Government . Washington, D. C:
The American Enterprise Institute, 1966.
Newspapers
Hoffman, David. "Senate Votes Down SST Funds." The Washington Post
December 4, 1970.
Periodicals
Business Week . "Congress Grabs for Fiscal. Reins." May 18, 1968.
Congressional Quarterly Service. Congress and the Nation .
Washington, D. C: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965.
Congressional Quarterly Service. Congress and the Nation - Vol. II .
Washington, D. C: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1969,
Congressional Quarterly Service. Congressional Quarterly .
Washington, D. C: Congressional Quarterly Service,
September 18, 25; October 9; December 25, 1970.

75
Congressional Quarterly Service. Congressional Quarterly Almanac
.
Washington, D. C: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1967,
Rabb, Charles. "Obsolenscence on the Hill." The Nation
,
March 31, 1969, pp. 390 - 392.
Sorensen, Theodore C. "Reforming Congress." Saturday Review
,
July 16, 1966, p. 22.
The Nation . May 31, 1965, pp. 580 - 582.
Public Documents
Employment Act of 1946. Statutes at Large . Vol. LX. (1969).
U. S. Congress. House. 1965 Joint Economic Report . House Rept.
175, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965.
U. S. Congress. House. 1970 Joint Economic Report . House Rept.
91-972, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970.
U. S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Twentieth Anniversary
of the Employment Act of 1946 . 89th Cong., 2nd sess.,
February 23, 1966.
U. S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Twentieth Anniversary
of the Employment Act of 1946 . Supplement to Hearings




U. S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Report of the Sub-
Committee on Economy in Government on Federal Transportation
Expenditure . Joint Committee Print, 91st Cong., 2nd sess.,
1970.
U. S. Congress. Senate. Senator Warren G. Magnuson speaking
on behalf of his proposal for two separate sessions of
Congress and establishing the calendar year as the fiscal
year. S. 3113, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., December 23, 1969.
Congressional Record , CXV, S 17743 - S 17746.
U. S. Congress. Senate. Robert P. Hey's article "Congress May
Update Appropriation Machinery", reprinted from The
Christian Science Monitor
, December 16, 1969. Congressional
Record, CXV, S 17745 - S 17746.

76
U. S. Congress. Senate. Fiscal Act of 1970 (A Bill) . S. 3113, 91st
Cong. , 2nd sess. , 1969.
U. S. Congress. Senate. Report of the Joint Economic Committee
on the Federal Budget as an Economic Document . Senate
Rept. 396, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963.
Personal Interviews
McHugh, Lough! in F. Staff Economists. Joint Economic Committee.
Personal interview on November 13, 1970.
Spina, Samuel. Legislative Staff Assistant to Senator Warren

















Congressional reforms to regain control
3 2768 001 92330 3
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
